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The apparent revival of non-consensual bride abduction in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is somewhat
surprising seventy years after the Soviet state banned the practice and introduced sweeping
legislation to emancipate women. This article relies on local discourses of shame and tradition to
explain changing marriage practices and to mark a shift towards greater patriarchy in post-Soviet
Central Asia. Discourses of shame are mobilized by local actors in support of the popular view that a
woman should ‘stay’ after being abducted. Women can and do resist abductions, but they risk
dealing with the burden of shame. Further, in Kyrgyzstan, where bride abduction is increasingly
re-imagined as a national tradition, women and activists who challenge this practice can be viewed
as traitors to their ethnicity. In post-Soviet society, these discourses of shame and tradition have
helped men assert further control over female mobility and female sexuality.
My first encounter with bride abduction took place in 1994 while I was conducting
fieldwork in a rural town in southern Kazakhstan. I was living with a Kazakh family
when the neighbour’s 18-year-old daughter, Raisa, was abducted by a stranger who lived
in a nearby village and wanted to marry her.1 A few months later, my host family’s
19-year-old daughter,Aigul, was abducted by her college boyfriend.Although the Soviet
Union established laws banning forced marriages in the 1920s, these two experiences
revealed that bride abductions were a reality in the 1990s and that they varied greatly
from one case to the next. While Raisa was surprised and upset by the abduction,
Aigul conspired in her own kidnapping in order to avoid a marriage that her parents
preferred.
In a previous article, I have described the rise of bride abduction in the post-Soviet
period, the different motives used to explain this practice, and the varying levels of
consent (Werner 2004a). Relying on ethnographic accounts of bride abduction in
southern Kazakhstan, the following article gives voice to Kazakh women and men who
have experienced social transformations throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet
periods. In the first section, I provide a cross-cultural framework for understanding
bride abduction and present two stories of non-consensual bride abduction in con-
temporary Kazakhstan. I then provide a brief historical overview of marriage practices
and gender relations among the Kazakhs in the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras. In the final
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sections, I look at how discourses of shame and tradition mark a shift towards greater
patriarchy. I use marriage practices as a prism for understanding how Kazakh ‘culture’
is being dissected and reconstructed by local actors in ways that are shifting power
relations between men and women.
I focus on two issues related to bride abduction that are contested by local commu-
nity members. First, there is the question of what a young woman should do after she
has been abducted against her will. Combining anthropological theories on honour
and shame (Abu-Lughod 1986, 1993; Wikan 2008) with feminist understandings of
gender-based violence (Mani 1998; Maynard 1993), I argue that cultural values related
to honour and shame have been mobilized in a way that justifies the popular view that
a woman should ‘stay’ after being abducted, and that these views help men assert
further control over female mobility and female sexuality in the post-Soviet period.
Borrowing Foucault’s notion of resistance, however, I demonstrate that in a variety of
ways Kazakh women are resisting the power that comes from shame. Second, there is
the issue of whether bride abduction is an ‘authentic’ tradition in Kazakh and Kyrgyz
society. A significant difference exists between attitudes in Kazakhstan, where non-
consensual bride abduction is not perceived to have strong ties to the past, and views in
Kyrgyzstan, where non-consensual bride abduction is defended as a national ‘tradition’
with long historical roots. In Kyrgyzstan, international and local activists have chal-
lenged the historical legitimacy of this practice, arguing that its current manifestations
are a violation of human rights. This localized debate relates to broader anthropological
concerns about the conflict between cultural relativism and human rights issues
(Merry 2006) and the relationship between narratives of the past and politics of the
present (Anagnost 1997). Owing to the belief in the historical legitimacy of bride
abduction, combined with values related to honour and shame, I also argue that male
control over female mobility and female sexuality has become more pronounced in
Kyrgyzstan, as reflected by higher rates of non-consensual bride abductions.
Bride abduction: universal patterns, particular realities
Bride abduction is a marriage practice that has been found in settings across Europe,
Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas (Ayres 1974; Barnes 1999; McLennan 1970
[1865]). In a cross-cultural analysis, Barbara Ayres (1974) distinguishes four different
marriage practices that involve the abduction of a bride. According to her typology,
‘wife raiding’ involves a daring attack in which the men from one community jointly
steal women from another community. With ‘genuine bride theft’, the groom targets a
specific woman, usually from his own community; the groom’s family provides the
bride’s family with an apology or compensation; and the groom’s family usually
establishes affinal relations with the bride’s family after the abduction. In the case of
‘mock bride theft’, the bride, pretending to resist her captors, appears to be a helpless
victim and obedient daughter, whereas in reality she is eloping by choice. Finally, with
‘ceremonial capture’, the abduction is a ritual performance that takes place with the full
knowledge and consent of the bride and her family members. In many societies, several
of these practices can coexist at any given time. This is the case with Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, where wife raiding is absent, but genuine bride theft, mock bride theft, and
ceremonial capture are all present in the contemporary period.
In the Kazakh language, these three related practices are referred to with the single
term qyz alyp qashu, which translates literally as ‘take the girl and run’. Both abduction
cases mentioned in the introduction would be categorized as qyz alyp qashumarriages,
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even though the latter case might be better described as an ‘elopement’ in the English
language. In his study of bride abductions among the Yoruk of Turkey, Bates (1974: 272)
observes a similar conflation of terms, and argues that the two forms of abductions are
not distinguished linguistically because the abduction is regarded as an attack on the
bride’s family’s honour and property (whether or not the bride consents). In modern
Kazakh society, where views towards abduction are conflicted, the language allows a
distinction between a non-consensual abduction (kelisimsiz qyz alyp qashu) and a
consensual abduction (kelisimmen qyz alyp qashu). As I discuss further below, whether
the abduction is consensual or not, it is the abduction itself that damages the family’s
honour and the bride’s acceptance of the marriage serves to restore that honour.
Recent studies of these marriage practices in Central Asia use the term ‘bride kid-
napping’ as the English-language translation for qyz alyp qashu in Kazakh and kyz ala
kachuu in Kyrgyz (Handrahan 2000; 2004; Kleinbach 2003; Kleinbach, Ablezova &
Aitieva 2005; Kleinbach & Salimjanova 2007; Werner 2004a). The terms ‘non-
consensual kidnapping’ and ‘consensual kidnapping’ are used in English to indicate
the sub-categories in the local languages.2 As in the case of ‘female circumcision’, the
act of naming this practice requires careful consideration (Walley 2006). For example,
the term ‘bride kidnapping’ is based on a verb that originated in reference to the illegal
abduction of children for labour or ransom, and therefore contains subtle implica-
tions that the bride is a child (or child-like) and that she might be held for ransom.
Central Asian brides are usually 17 or older so they are not quite children anymore,
and ransom never comes into play. One alternative term, ‘bride theft’, suggests that the
bride is a type of property that can be stolen, while another alternative, ‘bride capture’,
conveys the image of a bride being captured as a prize in a contest. In this article, I
have decided to use the term ‘bride abduction’ because it is less problematic than the
other terms.
In other cultures where bride abduction has been documented in the past, evidence
suggests that the practice has abated or ended with the emergence of modern laws and
social norms (Ahearn 2001; McLaren 2001). The opposite is true in Central Asia, where
forced abductions have become increasingly common since the fall of the Soviet Union,
particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Amsler & Kleinbach 1999; Werner 2004a).
In a typical forced abduction, the groom and several male friends use force or deception
to abduct a woman and take her to the groom’s home. She is then pressured by the
groom’s female relatives to accept the marriage and to write a letter to her parents. The
apparent resurgence of bride abduction is somewhat surprising seventy years after
the Soviet state banned the practice and introduced sweeping legislation to emancipate
women.
Bride abduction has gained more international notoriety in Kyrgyzstan, where it
occurs more frequently and is more geographically dispersed than in Kazakhstan,
where it is locally perceived to be concentrated in Southern Kazakhstan province
(Kleinbach 2003;Werner 2004a). In each case of bride abduction, there is an established
sequence of events that is remarkably similar in both countries. Every instance,
however, has its own peculiarities, including the details regarding who participates in
the abduction, why the groom chooses to abduct a particular bride at a particular time,
and how the bride and her family respond to the abduction. The two stories presented
below describe what ‘typically’ happens when a bride is abducted against her will, and
illustrate the cultural pressure that women receive regarding their decision to accept
the marriage.3
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One night, a loud knocking at the door woke me from a deep sleep. Everybody in the
house got up to greet our close neighbours, Serikzhan and Baqyt, and we all drank tea
as they recounted their disturbing news. Their 18-year-old daughter, Raisa, was missing
and they suspected that she had been abducted. The third daughter in a family with
seven girls and one boy, Raisa had recently completed high school and, like most young
and unmarried women, she still lived at home. Serikzhan and Baqyt did not know what
to do, but they were hoping that we knew something about her whereabouts, and they
mentioned that they might need to borrow my host family’s car. A few hours later, a
small group of men arrived at their house to ‘apologize’ for the fact that their relative
had abducted Raisa, and thus it was confirmed that Raisa had indeed been abducted by
a man who intended to marry her. These men even brought an ‘apology’ (keshirim)
payment in lieu of the bridewealth. Following custom, Raisa’s parents sent several
relatives, including another daughter, to check on her condition.
When her relatives returned the next day, they recounted Raisa’s version of the
events. On the evening of the abduction, she was home with her younger siblings while
her parents were attending a dinner party at a nearby house. While Raisa was outside
washing clothes, four young men entered her family’s fenced compound. They grabbed
her, forcefully placed her inside a waiting car, and drove a few kilometres to a nearby
village. She recognized one of the men from school, and wondered whether he was the
one who was abducting her. When the car arrived at its final destination, however, she
learned that she was being abducted by a stranger who had apparently fallen in love
with her at first sight, after seeing her one day at the local bazaar. She had not noticed
this stranger, Berik, before, and they had never so much as exchanged a few words.
Through his friends, Berik learned enough about her to know that he wanted to marry
her. He also found out where she lived, and planned the abduction with the help of
friends and relatives.
His parents supported this decision, and looked forward to having a daughter-in-law
to help with household chores. While he and his friends were abducting Raisa, his
parents were preparing a celebration at the home that they shared with Berik. His
parents and relatives greeted Raisa upon her arrival. The women ushered her into the
house, where they offered her a marriage scarf and tried to convince her to stay. As
Raisa explained to her relatives, she was not initially happy with this marriage at all. She
resented the fact that he was significantly older at 27 years of age. He also lived with his
elderly parents, and she was concerned that nobody in the household received a reliable
income. Nevertheless, his female relatives pressured her to accept the marriage, and she
acquiesced, not wanting to deal with the shame of being a ‘girl who returned home’.
Although they were extremely upset, her parents agreed that this was the right decision.
In the end, Raisa’s story has a happy ending. Several years after she was married, I
met with her while she, now with her first child, was visiting her parents. She told me
that her husband and his parents treated her well, and that she was very satisfied with
her marriage. In this regard, her experience differs from women who are abducted by
men who then proceed to abuse them physically. There is limited information available
for understanding women’s experiences after being abducted.
Knowing my interest in bride abductions, one of my friends introduced me to one
of her co-workers named Gulmira who lived in the small city of Turkestan. Gulmira
first met her abductor, Bauerzhan, while hanging out with some male and female
friends at a café near her office. She was 19 and worked as a receptionist in a government
office. Several of the young men she worked with were friends with Bauerzhan. The
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next day, they told her that he thought she was really beautiful and that he was falling
in love with her. The same friends answered all of his questions about her reputation
and her family. Bauerzhan, however, did not make a positive impression on Gulmira.
She did not like the fact that he was excessively drunk and crude on the day that they
met. Besides, she had a boyfriend who lived in Almaty, and she hoped to marry him
some day.
A few weeks later, Gulmira went to the same café with a group of young men and
women whom she knew from work, and once again she encountered Bauerzhan. He
was already quite drunk, and she tried to avoid him as much as possible. When it was
time to go home, her co-workers proposed that they all share a taxi. She did not realize
until later that some of her male co-workers were involved in the plot to abduct her.
They explained that they would take Bauerzhan home first since he was so drunk, and
then they would take her home. When they got to Bauerzhan’s house, she was forced
out of the car and into his family’s house. She was absolutely furious when she realized
that her friends had deceived her, and that she had been abducted by somebody that she
did not like. In her own words, she intentionally ‘acted like a wild woman’ when
anybody in the house tried to talk to her. She kept screaming and kept telling them that
she wanted to leave. The women in the house tried to get her to put on a kerchief that
would symbolize her acceptance, but she kept pushing it away. They tried to get her to
write a letter to her parents, falsely explaining that she agreed to this marriage, but she
refused to take the paper. She also rejected anything they offered her to eat or drink. She
believes that they expected her to calm down after a while, as many abducted brides do,
but she kept this up for hours. She refused to listen to the women’s arguments about
how Bauerzhan was a nice man, and how her life would be ruined if she refused to stay.
Eventually, Gulmira agreed to write a letter, knowing that it would be taken to her
family. Once her own relatives arrived, she thought that she could explain that the letter
was a lie, and then they would help rescue her from this situation. As she handed the
letter to Bauerzhan’s aunt, she angrily told them her plan to leave once her relatives
showed up. Bauerzhan’s relatives, however, heard this and decided that they should wait
a while before sending an apology delegation to her house. They knew that the longer
she stayed at their house, the more difficult it would be for her to leave. Once word got
out that she had been abducted, her reputation would be tarnished, and people would
question whether she was still a virgin. It did not matter whether she was or she was
not. What mattered is that people would no longer be sure. While Gulmira was antici-
pating the arrival of her relatives, her parents were frantically trying to find her. The
morning after she was abducted, her mother went to her workplace to see what she
could learn. Around this same time, Bauerzhan’s family informed her that they never
sent the first note to her parents, and they asked her if she had reconsidered her options
now that she had spent the night at their house. She told them that she did not care
about the consequences, and that she still did not want to become Bauerzhan’s wife.
His relatives finally accepted her decision, and let her write a second note to her
parents, in which she told them to come quickly. Although some parents encourage
their daughters to stay as a way to restore family honour, Gulmira’s parents agreed to
let their daughter return home. Her parents hoped that friends and neighbours would
not find out about the abduction, so that her reputation (and their honour) would not
be affected. Unfortunately, however, they learned that gossip travels fast, when Gul-
mira’s aunts from a nearby village showed up the next day, having already heard the
news. Despite their efforts to come up with explanations for her disappearance,
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Gulmira and her parents were unable to control the gossip about her abduction. Several
years after I heard Gulmira’s story, our mutual friend told me that she was still
unmarried. Her fate sadly seems to confirm what people say about girls who return
home after an abduction, but more research is required truly to understand what
happens to the small number of women who avoid these unwanted marriages.
In trying to make sense of these stories, I was forced to reconcile an interesting
paradox: many of the Kazakhs whom I interviewed find it to be very troubling when
men abduct young women against their will, yet they also believe that an abducted
woman should accept the marriage. In order to understand people’s current views
towards bride abduction and to explain how these views intersect with cultural con-
structions of the nation and modernity, it is first necessary to appreciate what Kazakh
marriage practices and gender relations were like in the pre-Soviet past, and how people
believe they changed during the Soviet period. In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, new dis-
courses about women’s position in society have emerged as people grapple with the
legacy of Soviet rule and the challenges of the post-Soviet transition. These new
discourses re-examine women’s role in the workplace and the family, women’s dress
and decorum, and the legal future of previously banned practices such as polygyny.
Much of the discourse is generated through comparisons between gender roles that
people imagine about the pre-Soviet past, gender ideals created by the Soviet state, and
gender images from the West. Just as Anagnost argues that the ‘the nation’s impossible
unity in the present rests on its (re)narrativization of the past’ (1997: 2), contemporary
discussions about bride abduction are thus anchored in contested memories of fomer
marriage practices.
The historical context of bride abduction
The Kazakhs are descendants of nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes who formerly
occupied the Eurasian steppes. Islam was first brought to the territory that is now
Kazakhstan by Arab conquerors in the eighth century, but it was not until the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries that Sufi dervishes converted many of the Kazakhs to Islam.
Kazakh nomads had a gendered division of labour, where men were expected to care for
livestock and defend the territory while women cooked, cleaned, took care of children,
served guests, and prepared textiles (Bacon 1980 [1966]). Ethnographic accounts of
pre-Soviet life suggest that most Kazakh marriages were arranged by family members
when the bride and groom were still young children. The bride and groom often did
not meet more than once or twice before their wedding night (Argynbaev 1978; Taizha-
nov 1995).Marriages were exogamous, in that the bride and groom could not be related
within seven generations on the male side of the family. The groom’s family paid
bridewealth in the form of cattle to the bride’s relatives, and the bride’s family provided
a dowry that included a yurt, household goods, clothing, and jewellery. These
exchanges strengthened relationships among specific groups of in-laws, while simulta-
neously establishing ties between different tribal lineages. With the exception of the
youngest son, who stayed in his parents’ yurt, the bride and groom received their own
yurt upon marriage, which was then erected within the groom’s father’s camp. Once
married, young brides were expected to provide in-laws with household services and to
have children.
Although arrangedmarriages were the norm, the historical and ethnographic record
indicates several exceptions to this state of affairs. For example, older men sometimes
made their own matches, especially when taking on a second or third wife. In addition
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to polygyny, the Kazakhs had a custom of levirate (Argynbaev 1978). In the pre-Soviet
period, bride abductions were an unusual occurrence. Grooms would abduct brides in
situations where the bride’s father refused a marriage, disliked the groom’s family,
demanded an excessively high bridewealth, and/or violated the matchmaking agree-
ment (Argynbaev 1978; Martin 2001; Taizhanov 1995). There were also situations where
a groom wanted to marry a particular girl, but she was already betrothed to another
man (Taizhanov 1995). At least one source hints that some of these ‘abducted brides’
might have played a role in planning their own abduction (Bacon 1980 [1966]). Among
the nearby Kyrgyz, the historical record suggests that non-consensual bride abductions
were infrequent and were punished by customary law (Kleinbach & Salimjanova 2007).
After nearly two centuries of increasing Russian influence, the territory of present-
day Kazakhstan was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1920.Within just a few years,
the Russian-dominated Bolshevik leaders began a campaign against Central Asian
traditional customs. Beginning in the early 1920s, the state passed laws that banned
various ‘crimes of custom’.Many of these crimes were practices that related to marriage
such as the payment of bridewealth, polygyny, child betrothals, levirate, and forced
marriages (Massell 1974). The new state also set the minimum legal age for marriage at
16, initiated a campaign against women’s veiling practices, and created new conditions
to increase gender equity in education and employment. State efforts to emancipate
women initially encountered local resistance. In the early years of Soviet rule, in
particular, there was often a significant gap between Soviet policy and actual practice
(Kamp 2008; Northrop 2004). For example, it was not uncommon for a man to marry
multiple women, but only register one as his official wife.
Despite such discrepancies between policy and practice, there is no doubt that
women’s lives in Central Asia were transformed by the end of Soviet rule, which
succeeded in creating the legal equality of the sexes. In the early 1920s, similar to most
Kazakh men, the vast majority of Kazakh women were illiterate and uneducated. By the
eve of the revolution, many Kazakh families were still relying on nomadic pastoralism
to meet most of their subsistence needs. Women did not work outside of the home,
though some may have earned income by selling home-made products (Werner
2004b). By the time the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, 96 per cent of Kazakh women
were literate, 52 per cent of university students in Kazakhstan were female, and approxi-
mately 90 per cent of women between the ages of 30 and 50 were employed (Bauer,
Boschmann & Green 1997). These transformations were accompanied by increasing
changes to marriage practices such that both men and women played a much more
significant role in selecting their own marriage partner by the end of Soviet rule.
Although the Soviet state criminalized arranged marriages and bride abduction, these
practices did not disappear. Instead, they were altered in unintended ways, much like
the persistence and transformation of clan identities (Schatz 2004). The changing
nature of these practices increasingly fits within the legal framework established by the
Soviet state. The gendered effects of Soviet rule are still being unravelled by scholars,
who acknowledge that, despite these achievements, the state failed to transform the
domestic division of labour or significantly reduce fertility rates (Kandiyoti 2007).
In 1991, the Kazakh Republic of the Soviet Union became an independent nation-
state. The newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan is a multi-ethnic state with over
fifteen million citizens. By the end of the Soviet period, women were accustomed to a
state that provided a number of economic and social benefits for women: free educa-
tion, guaranteed employment, generous maternity leaves, free day care, and monthly
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supplements for women with children. Post-Soviet women are coping with the realities
of an economy where the state has terminated its social contract with women and
transferred many of the costs of social reproduction to the household level
(Zhurzhenko 2004). Local and international NGOs have emerged to address various
women’s issues, including women’s poverty and violence against women.
Several scholars note that post-socialist states have nationalist agendas that promote
the ‘re-traditionalization’ of society (Gal & Kligman 2000). Kazakh nationalism gained
momentum in the late Soviet years when Gorbachev’s glasnost’ policies fostered a
re-examination of Soviet policies towards the Kazakhs. Although the post-Soviet Kaza-
khstan government remains secular and wary of Islamic fundamentalism, there is a
growing acceptance of Islam as an important element of Kazakh national identity
(Michaels 1998). Throughout Central Asia, gender relations are being redefined as
Islamic values are reinstated as the ‘guiding ethic for society’, national histories and
national traditions are rewritten and revived, and patriarchal authority (symbolized by
the male head of state) is reasserted (Akiner 1997: 284; Kandiyoti 2007). Contemporary
discourses on gender are also shaped by the infiltration of ‘Western’ fashions and
lifestyles that are more sexually explicit (Akiner 1997; Kuehnast 1998; Michaels 1998;
Tadjbaksh 1998). Now that the rigid borders separating East andWest are gone, Kazakhs
are purchasing European fashions, watching Latin American telenovellas, and travelling
abroad for trade, adventure, and study. These experiences in the ‘global village’ con-
tribute to the need to distinguish and maintain what is uniquely Kazakh.
Marriages in the contemporary period reflect these public debates regarding gender
roles and gendered behaviour. On the one hand, there has been a slight revival of
arranged marriages as a ‘traditional’ Kazakh practice, especially among the economic
elite, who can afford the associated expenses. These marriages sometimes start as a
conversation between parents when the children are young; however, all of the arranged
marriages that I learned about involved the full consent of the bride and groom. I also
encountered arranged marriages that were initiated by a young couple who asked their
parents to ‘arrange’ the marriage. On the other hand, there has been a significant
increase in non-consensual bride abductions. Consensual abductions still occur regu-
larly, but it is increasingly common for the groom to use some form of deception in
order to kidnap a woman. It is important to note that bride abduction is not an Islamic
practice, and unlike female circumcision practices, where some local actors wrongly
associate the practice with Islam (Walley 2006), people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgzystan
do not link bride abduction and religious custom.
The recent increase of non-consensual bride abduction cases has been documented
in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, yet the issue has received more political attention
in Kyrgyzstan, prompted by Western scholars, non-governmental organizations, and
local government officials. The issue clearly moved beyond scholarly attention with the
distribution of the film Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan. While teaching at a university
in Kyrgyzstan, Peter Lom, a European philosophy professor, decided to bring greater
awareness of bride abduction by producing this film. First broadcast in March 2004 as
a twenty-minute segment to a US audience on PBS’s Frontline show, the film was
expanded later that year to fifty-one minutes (Lom 2004a; 2004b). In collaboration
with local scholars and local NGOs, international NGOs have also started to press the
government to take steps to address this issue. In 2006, for example, Human Rights
Watch (2006) published a 140-page report on the problems of domestic violence and
bride abduction in the Kyrgyz Republic. Among other things, the report recommends
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that the Kyrgyz government enforce existing laws, compile statistics on unlawful abduc-
tions, establish a nationwide public awareness campaign, provide assistance for victims
of bride abduction, and educate law enforcement officers. The United Nations Popu-
lation Fund (UNFPA) (2007) has also published a fact sheet on bride kidnapping in
Kyrgyzstan, and has included this issue in its gender equality programmes. In response
to all of these developments, the government has acknowledged the problem, and held
a public hearing on the problem of bride kidnapping in April 2007, organized by the
Human Rights Commission of the Government of Kyrgyzstan.4
In comparison, the issue of non-consensual bride abduction has gone relatively
unnoticed in Kazakhstan. One Kazakhstani umbrella organization, Silk Road Women,
mentions that bride abduction takes place in Kazakhstan (as well as Kyrgyzstan),5 yet
affiliated non-governmental organizations give much more visibility to the problems
of trafficking women from Kazakhstan to other countries (Snajdr 2005). In a report
by the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) on the status
of women after the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the authors
acknowledge that bride abduction is a form of ‘culture-based violence against
women’ in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The report also notes that the new Kaza-
khstani Criminal Code, which came into force on 1 January 1998, dropped a previous
clause that criminalized the abduction of women against their will (WEDO 2005: 59).
Meanwhile, the international NGOs who describe this problem in Kyrgyzstan, includ-
ing Human Rights Watch and the UNFPA, have not made it a priority issue for
Kazakhstan. And the international media has only covered this practice in Kyrgyzstan
(Lloyd-Roberts 1999; Smith 2005). One possible exception is the recent comedy Borat:
cultural learnings of America for make benefit glorious nation of Kazakhstan (2006), in
which the lead character, the fictional journalist ‘Borat’, attempts to marry Pamela
Anderson by forcibly abducting her from a bookstore. Since the film contains so
much ridiculous content known to be fictional, such as the ‘Running of the Jew’
festival, the audience is likely to assume that the practice of bride abduction is
also fictional.
Shame and the decision to stay after an abduction
I now want to turn to the issue of how people talk about a woman’s decision to accept
or reject a marriage after being abducted against her will. Although most women feel
pressured to accept the marriage, some women (like Gulmira above) decide to return
home. Many of the same people who told me that they believe it is wrong for a man to
abduct a woman without her consent also believe that it is wrong for an abducted
woman to reject the marriage. These seemingly paradoxical views were held by both
men and women.When I pointed out this apparent contradiction to one of my research
assistants, she told me two proverbs that Kazakhs cite in reference to abducted brides.
The first proverb, ‘Attap bosqan bosagha – altyn bosagha’, can be translated as ‘The
threshold that has been crossed is the golden threshold’. The second proverb, ‘Birinshi
baq baq, ekinshi baq qai baq, o beibaq?!’, is best translated as ‘A first happiness [marriage]
is happiness, a second happiness [marriage] is what kind of happiness? – no happiness!’
As she explained, both proverbs indicate that it is a woman’s fate to stay and that it is
‘bad luck’ for an abducted bride to return home.
Not only is it bad luck, but many Kazakhs believe that it is shameful for an abducted
bride to return. A woman who rejects the groom will then be known as a ‘qaittyp kelgen
qyz’ (‘a girl who returned home’). The significance of this stigma is best understood
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within the broader context of honour and shame, where a family’s honour is linked to
female modesty. Anthropological theories on honour and shame can help us under-
stand why a woman would feel that she has little choice but to stay, and why parents
who love their daughter dearly would also believe that this is the best decision. Anthro-
pologists working in the Middle East have long noted the link between male honour
and female sexuality (Abu-Lughod 1986; 1993; Wikan 2008). A family’s reputation can
be damaged if a daughter, wife, or sister conducts herself inappropriately. Even uncon-
firmed rumours about inappropriate behaviour can dishonour a family. The important
thing is the public knowledge of the transgression or the rumour (Wikan 2008: 6).
Although the concepts of honour and shame resonate strongly throughout the Muslim
world, there is great variation across time and space in what is considered to be
appropriate female behaviour and the extent to which men (and women) respond to
behaviour that is perceived to be shameful (Wikan 2008: 49). Among Kurdish immi-
grants in Sweden, for example, a young woman who disgraces her family by dating a
Swede might be killed by her own male relatives. Attitudes towards such killings vary
within the Kurdish community, and change depending on the circumstances. Accord-
ing to Wikan (2008: 52-7), immigrant women probably face greater risks of being a
victim of honour killing than women who remain in Turkey, because the men feel more
threatened by the prospect of cultural assimilation.
Anthropological theories about honour relate to bride abduction because themajor-
ity of societies with bride abduction place a high value on virginity. Stross, for example,
suggests that a Tzeltal woman kidnapped against her will cannot prove that she is an
unwilling victim. Further, ‘[o]nce kidnapped her reputation in the community changes
irrevocably. She is presumed to have been violated sexually and is no longer worth
much of a bride price if any’ (1974: 341-2). According to the Kazakhs I interviewed, a
woman’s reputation is publicly questioned after she has been abducted. As Wikan
(2008) argues, the reality of the situation matters much less than the fact that the
possibility has entered the public conscious. This explains why Gulmira’s family tried
so hard to suppress the gossip about their daughter’s abduction. In addition to having
a dubious sexual reputation, a woman who ‘returns home’ is considered to be stubborn
and belligerent, and therefore less desirable as a marriage partner (and a daughter-in-
law). Although people might sympathize with the difficult situation faced by an
abducted woman, many believe that she is better off accepting the marriage than
provoking the shame that would befall her and her family if she came home.
When a woman is forcefully abducted, these cultural beliefs are invoked in persua-
sive performances to pressure the bride to accept the marriage. This social pressure
comes from a variety of sources: the groom and his accomplices, the groom’s relatives,
and the bride’s relatives. By accepting the marriage, the bride restores honour to her
own family, while simultaneously preventing shame from falling upon the groom’s
family. Social pressure from the groom and his accomplices may include violence or
threats of violence. For example, a young Kazakh woman recounted how her neighbour
was abducted by a group of men who threatened to rape her if she shamed the groom
by declining the marriage. She was afraid and felt like she had no choice but to accept
the marriage. After the groom and his accomplices bring the bride to his house, his
female relatives play an important role in convincing the bride to stay. His mother,
aunts, and sisters-in-law all remind her of the shame and unhappiness that will cer-
tainly befall her if she chooses to return home. After the groom’s family informs the
bride’s family of her whereabouts, these same arguments are often reiterated by
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members of the bride’s family. By pressuring the bride to stay, these older, married
women are helping to reproduce patriarchal institutions in a way that is reminiscent of
Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1988) concept of the ‘patriarchal bargain’ under conditions of classic
patriarchy. Bride abduction therefore is not a simple act of male dominance over
women, as women also help to reinforce male dominance.
At the same time, alternative voices do exist, and offer emotional support to the
victims of non-consensual abductions. Some women, like Gulmira’s mother, support
their daughter’s decision to reject an unwanted marriage. Further, brides abducted
against their will are not passive agents. Borrowing Foucault’s (1990 [1976]) idea that
the existence of power engenders resistance, I argue that Kazakh women often enact
their own performances of resistance in response to the power of shame that suggests
they should stay. These forms of resistance may or may not succeed, and abducted
women need to act quickly if they want to avoid an undesirable marriage. As a general
rule, unmarried women are warned to avoid rides from men, even with close acquain-
tances. Despite the known risks, however, they cannot always resist the convenience of
a car ride over the unreliable and slow alternative of using mass transportation or
walking. Once a woman realizes that she is being kidnapped, she may try to get out of
the situation. Lazzat, a 20-year-old woman, told me about how she talked her way out
of a kidnapping situation. One night, she and a female friend agreed to ride with their
male friend Yerlan to a wedding. When Yerlan started to drive in the wrong direction,
Lazzat feared that he was planning to abduct her. She reminded him that he was a
‘modern college-educated’ man, and that men like that do not abduct women. He was
persuaded by her argument, and news of the aborted abduction did not get out.
Another woman,Madina, jumped out of a moving car in order to escape her abductor.
Neither of these women were labelled as a ‘girl who returns home’, because they were
able to escape before they were brought into a public setting with lots of witnesses.
After a bride crosses the threshold into the groom’s house, she still has several
opportunities to resist the marriage. Upon arrival at his house, a female member of the
groom’s household usually presents the bride with a kerchief (oramal). Since married
women traditionally wore a kerchief over their hair, the bride’s acceptance of the
kerchief is a public sign that she is willing to marry the groom. Although willing brides
do not want to appear too eager to take the scarf, they often put it on within the first
hour or two. Brides who are abducted without their consent might not put the scarf on
for hours or even days.
Shortly after her arrival, a bride is also asked to write a letter to her family stating that
she came of her own free will. Taken to her parents as evidence that she accepts the
marriage, the letter provides another opportunity for the bride to express her resis-
tance. I talked to several abducted brides who were completely distraught for hours,
screaming at anybody who approached them, throwing things around the room, and
even breaking windows. Aigerim, for example, was kidnapped when she was 20 years
old. When asked to write a letter, she repeatedly wrote: ‘I don’t want to stay here! I did
not agree to this!’ The groom’s aunts kept telling her that they could not take this note
to her parents. They kept bringing her a fresh piece of paper and dictated the words that
they wanted her to write. Eventually, she gave in and wrote the letter, though it took
several months before she accepted her husband’s friendly gestures.
Such acts of resistance often fail, but occasionally an abducted bride is rescued by her
parents or even released by the groom’s parents. As one informant told me, a distraught
bride should also try to send an urgent message to her family via a friend who
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accompanied her to the groom’s house or an ally in the groom’s house. In one unusual
case, an abducted woman managed to send a message to her boyfriend, who then came
to her rescue. Instead of returning to her parent’s home, she escaped from her abduc-
tors’ home in order to marry the young man whom she loved. Suggesting that this was
not the proper way for a Kazakh woman to behave, one middle-aged man suggested
that this woman was probably influenced by all of the ‘Mexican’ soap operas that were
broadcast in Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union. He even decided that the
women in his household should not be allowed to watch these programmes for a while.
This particular abduction demonstrates that some women are successfully able to resist
these marriages, though they may be publicly criticized for what some might consider
as subversive acts.
Questioning the historical authenticity of bride abduction
The second contentious issue is whether non-consensual bride abduction is a practice
with roots in the pre-Soviet past, or whether it is a new manifestation of a practice that
has transformed over the decades.When I asked people in Kazakhstan to talk about the
origins of bride abduction, most people seemed to believe that arranged marriages
were the dominant norm and that bride abductions were unusual in the pre-Soviet
past. Several respondents were even concerned that non-consensual bride abduction
was a shameful practice for Kazakhstan as it conflicted with their notion of what a
‘modern’ state should look like. This idea is well illustrated by a letter published in a
national women’s magazine,Qazaqstan Aiyelderi, in 2001.Written by Elmira, a 16-year-
old girl from a village in Almaty province, the letter asks the editors to speak about the
legitimacy of this practice:
Our Kazakh people, from ancient times, cherished and lavished attention on, and especially respected,
girls. Among Kazakhs, don’t we have an expression that ‘a daughter is a guest’? And, for our nation-
ality, isn’t one of the basic traditions to give the daughter by hand to the groom, and to send her off
following the ancient rites? If so, why now is it so rare to see the tradition where the girl is given by
hand to the boy? And in its place, you often see a girl being abducted, and if she stays, the marriage
scarf is placed on her head. Does this way of uniting couples count as a Kazakh tradition? Could it be
that this method has been modified in the contemporary period? If a girl throws down the marriage
scarf that has been placed on her own head by force, and she leaves without spending the night, then
isn’t there a spiritual expression that states that the girl will not be happy her entire life? I look forward
to your answers to these questions.
In their response, the editors point out that there are two different types of bride
abduction (consensual and non-consensual), and stress that women should not accept
the marriage if they are not in love with the groom. Although the editors did not fully
address Elmira’s question about whether this practice has changed in the contempo-
rary period, several of the people I interviewed had detailed explanations for how
marriage practices had changed in the twentieth century. In reference to pre-Soviet
traditions, one woman in her twenties explained that bride abductions in the past were
limited to cases where the bride’s parents objected to the marriage. In such cases, a
woman might have used abduction as a way to resist the patriarchal norm of arranged
marriage by conspiring with her intended groom. In another variation of pre-Soviet
abductions, a woman told me that men from poor families were able to marry women
from wealthier families by abducting a bride.
Most of the Kazakhs I interviewed believe that marriage practices changed signifi-
cantly during the Soviet period, though they do not always agree on how and when
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these changes took place. One middle-aged woman, for example, believed that bride
abductions became more popular after collectivization (in the 1930s) because families
could no longer afford bridewealth. In contrast, two elderly women who got married in
the 1940s mentioned how marriages at that time were often still arranged by parents
without the daughters’ input. Others noted that arranged marriages became less
common in the 1950s, and transformed in nature. To varying degrees, parents still tried
to influence the process, by initiating certain introductions and by offering or denying
their consent. But, increasingly, children were allowed to express their opinion about
these matches. As one woman explained, some young couples met on their own, and
then later asked their parents to go through the formality of ‘arranging’ the marriage,
which entailed an elaborate exchange of gifts and dinner parties between the in-laws.
As arranged marriages decreased in frequency between 1950 and 1970, two alterna-
tive forms of marriage gained in popularity: non-traditional ‘Komsomol’ marriages
and bride abductions (Werner 2004a). A Komsomol marriage was a frugal wedding,
encouraged by the Communist Party and centred on an official ceremony at the civil
registry.At the same time, newmanifestations of bride abduction were compatible with
both Kazakh gender norms and Soviet values, and provided a more economical
wedding than an arranged marriage. A middle-aged woman explained how bride
abduction resolved a conflict between traditional Kazakh values and Soviet values. For
her, according to traditional Kazakh values, unmarried women were expected to listen
to their parents and their elders when it came to their marriage choices. Women who
were ‘abducted’ did not appear to be ‘running away’ with a boyfriend and thus elders
regarded them as appropriately modest. At the same time, Soviet values encouraged
women to select marriage partners on their own; and they did, as long as the abduction
was planned and staged, sometimes with the help of both sets of parents. Several
respondents told me that bride abductions during the Soviet years rarely involved
deception or force, unlike many of the more recent bride abductions (Werner 2004a).
For families with less income and fewer resources, bride abduction provided an alter-
native that reduced and delayed some of these new wedding costs, without eliminating
all of the expected celebrations. Bride abductions surged in popularity in the 1970s,
a time when average wedding expenses increased. Today, people still cite the cost of
weddings as a primary reason for abducting a bride, rather than having an arranged
marriage.
Although qyz alyp qashu serves as a general concept that can be used to describe a
variety of situations, many Kazakhs make a strong moral distinction between consen-
sual and non-consensual bride abduction. In describing a case where a young woman
was abducted by a complete stranger, a woman in her thirties expressed strong sym-
pathy for the bride, who was not able to marry the person she loved. One middle-aged
man even worried that my interest in bride abduction could bring international aware-
ness to a practice that he considered to be shameful for ethnic Kazakhs. He thought it
was important to clarify that most bride abductions, including his son’s marriage,
involve the consent of the bride. I also encountered several men, including a rural judge
and a Kazakh student in the United States, who flatly denied the existence of non-
consensual abductions. Either these men are truly unaware of the nature of some
abductions, or they are also trying to protect their national culture. For many, consen-
sual bride abduction is viewed favourably because it is based on a love match. This idea
is reflected in the editorial response to Elmira’s question in Qazaqstan Aiyelderi:
‘[W]hen a girl is abducted forcibly, it is not love, it is infatuation, complete infatuation’.
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The perceived morality of a consensual abduction, however, can vary depending on
one’s individual position. For example, when a young couple elopes without the
parents’ consent or knowledge, the bride’s parents are often upset that their daughter
made this decision, especially in cases when they had their own preference for whom
she should marry.
Answers to my questions about bride abduction were certainly influenced by my
position as a Western, female anthropologist, as well as by the context of the interview.
I find it interesting that so many people I interviewed were willing to make moral
judgements against non-consensual abductions, whereas people in Kyrgyzstan seem
more likely to defend the practice to Western scholars. The only people who spoke in
favour of non-consensual bride abductions were young men who admitted that they
had participated in several such acts. A group of three young men were so unabashed
when it came to describing abductions of women who were struggling to free them-
selves that I had to wonder whether they were embellishing their stories for my benefit.
They did not think it was important for the woman to consent to the marriage ahead
of time, because she would ‘become happy after a week or so’ (Werner 2004a).
Although an anthropological perspective would question the very notion that ‘tra-
ditions’ remain constant, local beliefs about the historical authenticity of bride abduc-
tion can have important political implications. As the Human Rights Watch report
states, ‘A consequence of regarding bride kidnapping as a tradition is that it becomes
part of the unwritten social charter and is deemed above criticism’ (Human Rights
Watch 2006). In other words, activists who oppose non-consensual abduction are likely
to have a stronger case if they can demonstrate that this is a new practice, or a newly
manifested version of an older practice. Regarding this issue, there appears to be a
significant discrepancy between what people are saying in Kazakhstan, where bride
abduction is more concentrated in the southern provinces, and what people are saying
in Kyrgyzstan, where bride abduction is geographically widespread.
In Kyrgyzstan, there seems to be a strong divide between the public notion that bride
abduction is a traditional practice and the scholarly opinion that non-consensual
abduction was rare in the past. In one survey conducted in northeastern Kyrgyzstan, 38
per cent of respondents replied that a particular bride was abducted because ‘[t]his is
a good traditional way to get a bride’ (Kleinbach et al. 2005). According to the authors,
these findings suggest that bride abduction is viewed as a culturally acceptable practice
that has been revived from pre-Soviet times. In a different survey conducted in the
Jalalabad region, 40 per cent of adults interviewed believe that non-consensual bride
abduction was practised in the early twentieth century (Kleinbach & Salimjanova
2007). Handrahan adds that bride abduction has ‘become a primary act defining
cultural identity and manhood’ (2004: 208). Men are able to claim their Kyrgyz eth-
nicity by establishing their dominance over women while abducting a Kyrgyz bride,
while Kyrgyz women identify their loyalty to their ethnicity by accepting this act of
violence (Handrahan 2004).
This is not to say that all Kyrgyz believe that non-consensual bride abduction is a
national tradition. In addition to the 60 per cent who did not feel that bride abduction
was a tradition in the pre-Soviet period, Kleinbach and his collaborators have inter-
viewed dozens of scholars, themajority of whom disagree with the popularly held belief
that this is a revival of a customary practice from the pre-Soviet past. Instead, these
scholars believe that non-consensual abduction was very rare in pre-Soviet times, and
onmany occasions it did involve the consent of the bride, against the will of her parents
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(Kleinbach & Salimjanova 2007). As evidenced by the surveys described above, these
beliefs are not limited to scholars, though both Kleinbach and Handrahan emphasize
that the popular belief is that non-consensual bride abduction is a national tradition.
Conclusion
Although violence against women can be found in all societies, certain patterns of
violence, such as female genital mutilation and honour killings, have been defined as
‘culturally determined’ practices (Penn & Nardos 2003: 87). As transnational feminists
and localNGOs take steps to change thesepractices,conflictsoftenarisebetweenactivists
who attack gender-based violence in defence of human rights and local community
members who justify these practices in the name of culture (Merry 2006). Feminist
understandings of gender-based violence emphasize that violence serves as amechanism
for men to assert and maintain power over women. The threat of potential violence in
any cultural setting wheremen regularly commit acts of violence against women has the
affect of controlling or limiting women’s behaviour (Maynard 1993). In the case of bride
abduction, shame is the key concept employed indiscussions aboutwhether an abducted
woman should accept or reject a marriage. Even people who believe that an abducted
woman should not have to stay with her abductor believe that this act of resistance will
bring shame to her and her family.Women who accept a marriage after being abducted
avoid the shame that is inflicted on women who decide to reject a marriage.
The concept of shame is not novel to Central Asia, yet how shame is being used to
delineate appropriate gendered behaviour in contemporary society represents a break
with the Soviet past. During the Soviet period, the state promoted gender equality and
Kazakh womenwere encouraged tomake their own decisions about whom they wanted
to marry. And many of the people who married in the 1970s in particular insist that
brides were only abducted with their consent during this time period (Werner 2004a).
At that time, the act of abducting a bride without her consent would have been shameful
for the groom. In the post-Soviet period, the state has different priorities, such that the
construction of a national identity has assumed more importance than the Soviet goal
of achieving gender equality. The nation-building project in the present involves a
‘re-narrativization of the past’ (Anagnost 1997), and this process tends to romanticize
ideal gender relations thatmay ormay not have actually existed in the pre-Soviet period.
Although neither men nor women had much control over their marriage choices,
collective memories of the past tend to place more emphasis on the limited choices of
women. In addition to the impact of post-Soviet nationalism, discussions of proper
behaviour today can also be viewed in part as a reaction to the infiltration of ‘Western’
fashions and lifestyles (Kuehnast 1998; Michaels 1998). It is not uncommon for Kazakhs
to be concerned about these images of theWest, as evidenced by the reaction toWestern
soap operas discussed above. If young Kazakh women were to be influenced by these
images of the West, their sexuality would bring shame to their families. Such fears
therefore justify the need to reassert male control over female sexuality.
In addition to the concept of shame, it is important to consider how popular
conceptions of ‘tradition’ mark a shift towards patriarchy. Local understandings of
non-consensual bride abduction in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are contested and
negotiated in political environments where civil society, with its ties to transnational
flows of ideas and resources, has taken over the state’s role as the defender of women’s
rights, and where state and non-state actors have fostered a sense of pride in national
‘traditions’. Throughout the world, acts of violence against women are often defended in
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the name of culture,with the result that efforts to change these practices become framed
as a struggle between culture and human rights (Merry 2006). This is the case with
female circumcision, where some community actors invoke cultural beliefs in support
of these practices (Walley 2006).What is interesting about non-consensual bride abduc-
tion in Central Asia is that the notion of whether this is a national ‘tradition’ varies from
one country to the next. In Kazakhstan, most Kazakhs recognize that this practice has
changed significantly over time, and they do not view it as their traditional form of
marriage. In contrast, there is a relatively strong public perception in neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan that bride abduction is a national tradition that was suppressed during the
Soviet period (Kleinbach & Salimjanova 2007). As Anagnost argues, ‘[I]nterest in the
past originates out of concerns of the present’ (1997: 5). In the case of Kyrgyzstan,
popular efforts to re-imagine a past where men routinely abducted women to become
their wives are part of a larger political process in the present where the new nation-state
seeks to signal a sharp break with the Soviet past.Although the practice is contested, this
form of violence against women has become associated with Kyrgyz identity. In Kaza-
khstan, there are also efforts to re-imagine the national traditions, though this process
does not yet involve a belief that bride abductionwas a commonmarriage practice in the
past. In both countries, post-Soviet discourses of shame and tradition are shifting power
relations between men and women in ways that increase male control over female
mobility and female sexuality. These processes are more pronounced in Kyrgyzstan,
owing to a stronger belief in the historical legitimacy of bride abduction.
NOTES
This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Southern Kazakhstan province. During interviews with
over sixty Kazakh women and men, I asked them to talk about marriage practices in the past and the present.
I interviewed people from varying ages and social backgrounds, in both rural and urban settings. I attended
dozens of Kazakh weddings, bridal showers, engagement parties (qudalyq), and ‘face-opening’ (betashar)
ceremonies. I also conducted a survey that allowedme to obtain a rough estimate of the number of marriages
that could be classified as bride abductions, the level of consent involved with each of these marriages, and
how marriage patterns had changed over time (Werner 2004a).
Research for this article was funded by the Social Science Research Council and the National Council for
Eurasian and East European Research. A fellowship from the Melbern G. Glasscock Center at Texas A&M
provided the necessary time to write an early version. Special thanks to Simon Coleman, Madina Kenzhe-
garanova, Pauline Jones Luong, Kelly McMann, Neha Vora, and the anonymous reviewers for JRAI for
providing comments on various versions of this article. I would also like to acknowledge Aigul Baituova,
Tarbiye Orazbekova, Maria Parks, Andy Scherer, Zhanna Torebaeva, and Kamshat Torebaeva for their
assistance with this project.
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this article.
2 Although Kazakhs distinguish between an unmarried ‘girl’ (qyz) and a married ‘woman’ (aiyel), I use the
term ‘woman’ in this article to refer to both unmarried and married women.
3 The issue of consent (kelisim) is not straightforward. First, there is the issue of who is consenting to the
marriage: the bride, the groom, the bride’s family, or the groom’s family. Second, there is the issue of what the
bride has consented to: an interest in the groom, an interest in marrying the groom at some future time, or
an interest in marrying the groom right now. I frequently heard of cases where the abducted bride had
expressed interest in marrying the groom some day, but not right away. In these cases, I argue that the term
‘semi-consensual’ might be more appropriate (Werner 2004a).
4 I would like to thank Madeleine Reeves for bringing this event to my attention.
5 The website for this organization is no longer functioning.
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Mariage par rapt en Asie centrale postsoviétique : le retour du patriarcat
dans le discours local sur la honte et la tradition
Résumé
Le renouveau des enlèvements non consentis de femmes au Kazakhstan et au Kirghizstan peut surprendre,
soixante-dix ans après l’interdiction de cette pratique par l’État soviétique et la mise en place d’une
législation volontariste pour l’émancipation des femmes. Sur la base des discours locaux sur la honte et la
tradition, l’article explique ce changement de pratiques matrimoniales et met en lumière la résurgence du
patriarcat en Asie centrale postsoviétique. Les discours sur la honte sont mobilisés par les acteurs locaux
à l’appui de l’idée populaire qu’une femme doit « rester » après avoir été enlevée. Les femmes peuvent
résister aux enlèvements, et résistent effectivement, mais s’exposent ainsi au poids de la honte. Par ailleurs,
au Kirghizstan, où le rapt des femmes est de plus en plus ré-imaginé comme une tradition nationale, les
femmes et les militants qui contestent cette pratique peuvent être accusés de trahison envers leurs racines
ethniques. Ces discours sur la honte et la tradition ont aidé les hommes à reprendre le contrôle de la
mobilité et de la sexualité des femmes dans la société postsoviétique.
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